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Abstract: In this article, a security extension for the HiiMap Next Generation Internet
Architecture is presented. We regard a public key infrastructure which is integrated into
the mapping infrastructure of the locator/identiﬁer-split addressing scheme. The security
approach is based on Threshold Cryptography which enables a sharing of keys among the
mappingservers. Hence, amore trustworthyandfairapproach foraNext GenerationInternet
Architecture as compared to the state of the art approach is fostered. Additionally, we give
an evaluation based on IETF AAA recommendations for security-related systems.
Keywords: NGI; security; HiiMap; PKI; locator/identiﬁer-split; Threshold Cryptography
1. Introduction
Today’s Internet architecture faces some well-known limitations and many ongoing research activities
exist to deﬁne the so-called Next Generation Internet (NGI). As security was not a major concern whileFuture Internet 2011, 3 15
developing the current architecture, it is agreed that it needs to be an integral part of future concepts.
This is because the Internet has transformed from a communication means where users can exchange
ﬁles and messages to the basis of today’s economy with billions of participants.
To compensate for the lack of security of the original design, many add-ons have been deﬁned over
time. Each newly identiﬁed security risk resulted in a new ﬁx which was applied to one of the OSI layers.
The outcome are many speciﬁc security solutions spread over all layers ranging from IPSec encryption at
the network layer up to HTTPS in the application layer for example. One of the design goals for a Next
Generation Internet architecture is to anchor the security functionality in the network layer to provide a
clean and consistent approach for all participants without any need for further application layer security.
Especially trust has always been an issue in today’s communication infrastructure. Signiﬁcant additional
effort had to be put into establishing a trustworthy communication between two entities. Our approach
for a Next Generation Internet is designed to support this from day one.
The Hierarchical Internet Mapping Architecture (HiiMap) [1] is a clean-slate approach based on the
locator/identiﬁer-split principle [2]. It is a highly scalable and reliable approach with built-in mobility
support to also foster network-enabled mobile devices.
Our approach for a Next Generation Internet not only takes into account the emerging needs for a
more ﬂexible communication architecture but also a fair and equal mapping scheme distributed over
all participating countries [1]. This guarantees the continuity of the Internet as a global means of
communication devoid of political and social disputes.
In this article we outline our security approach for the HiiMap architecture and evaluate it according
to the recommendations of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard for Authentication,
Authorization and Accounting (AAA) [3].
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses related work before we give
a brief overview of the HiiMap architecture in Section 3. In Section 4 we detail the security approach
and give an evaluation of it in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this article.
2. Related Work
In this section we discuss some cryptographic fundamentals and related work.
2.1. Security in Communication Systems
There exist general paradigms which have to be fulﬁlled to assure that a system can be regarded as
secure. The Telecommunication Standardization Sector of the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU-T) [4] provides guidelines for security aspects in communication systems, which are available as
the ITU-T X.805 recommendation. [5]
2.1.1. Dimensions
Within X.805, 8 security dimensions are deﬁned which have to be kept in mind when designing a
security-related system:
• Access ControlFuture Internet 2011, 3 16
• Authentication
• Non-repudiation
• Data conﬁdentiality
• Communication security
• Data integrity
• Availability
• Privacy
2.1.2. Threats
On the other hand, there are mainly 4 threats to which a communication system might be exposed:
• Destruction of information and/or other resources
• Corruption or modiﬁcation of information
• Theft, removal or loss of information and/or other resources
• Disclosure of information.
2.2. Basic Principles of Cryptography
2.2.1. Public Key Infrastructure
Asymmetric crypto-systems use a public and a private key to provide secure communication between
network entities. The public key is visible to anyone whereas the private key must not be disclosed to
any other party than the key owner itself. A problem of asymmetric crypto-systems is the publishing of
the public key.
Today, the exchange of public keys is done via a public key infrastructure (PKI), e.g., deﬁned by the
ITU-T standard X.509 [6,7]. All approaches have in common that a particular user or node publishes
its public key on a key server of some sort from which it can be downloaded by other peers. After that,
encrypted and signed messages can be exchanged. This, of course, requires that each participating node
has to trust the key server. If a key pair ever gets lost, it can be revoked by including it in the so-called
Certiﬁcate Revocation List (CRL), where all invalid keys and certiﬁcates are kept [7].
In [8] Ellison et al. argue that today’s PKI based on certiﬁcate authorities (CA) imposes ten major
risks. They describe, for example, the problematic trust background of the self-proclaimed authorities
and discuss the weakest link issue of the CA structure. Furthermore they raise the question how the
certiﬁcate holder identiﬁes himself against the CA. They state that several procedures do exist and that
there are no consistencies over all CAs.Future Internet 2011, 3 17
2.2.2. Cryptographic Namespaces
Cryptographic namespaces take a different approach for key distribution. Instead of requiring
a PKI, the public key is incorporated into the address of an end node. The Host Identity
Protocol [9], for example, hashes the public key to a 128 bit value and uses this address as the identiﬁer
in a locator/identiﬁer-split architecture. Other approaches like Accountable Internet Protocol [10] and
Cryptographically Generated Addresses [11] incorporate a hash of the public key into an IPv6 address.
In that way, a peer is able to instantly verify that the end node it is communicating with is in possession
of the corresponding private key. There is no need to query a third party for the public key, hence no
requirement for an additional trusted entity within the network.
At a ﬁrst glance, the cryptographic namespace seems to be a very promising idea, however, it has
some major downsides. First of all, it adds inﬂexibility to key and address management. Whenever
one of the items has to change (e.g., extended key length required), the other item has to change as
well. Another problem is the missing link between the public key and a legal person. The cryptographic
namespace only ensures that the end node with a certain address is also holding the valid private key for
it. In practice, however, it is seldom relevant which end node we are talking to. For example, we want
to talk to a speciﬁc person or our bank and not to a speciﬁc box of hardware down in a cellar. Another
crucial point is the lack of key revocation. In case a private key gets lost or disclosed, the end node needs
to generate a new hpublic key,private key,addressi-triple. Peers of that end node, however, might
not immediately be aware of the address change and an attacker is able to use the old address combined
with the private key to spoof his identity. Finally, in case the address space is quite full, it is easy for
an attacker to generate a random key-address-triple which is already in use by another end node. In that
way, an attacker is able to hide his identity.
2.2.3. Threshold Cryptography
A very promising ﬁeld of cryptography within a ﬂat hierarchy is Threshold Cryptography. This
follows a (k,n)-threshold scheme. Here, n stands for the number of invoked parties and k for the
minimum number which is necessary to decrypt a secret. To explain Threshold Decryption it is
helpful to take a look to the principles of Shamir’s Secret Sharing [12]. Shamir requires one dealer,
which is trusted by all parties, as he knows every part of the key and he has to distribute them
to the parties. Shamir’s scheme relies on the construction of a polynomial following the pattern
f(x) = s+a1x+a2x2 +...+at−1xt−1 where s represents the secret. Hence, all ai values can be chosen
unrestrictedly by the dealer. Afterwards, the dealer can generate n arbitrary value tuples (x,f(x)), where
x can be disclosed, but as f(x) is a share of the key, it must be kept as a secret. At least k value tuples
are required to calculate a polynomial and consequently also the secret s.
In Figure 1, a polynomial is shown where the y-value is marked blue at x = 0. This is equivalent to
the secret s in Shamir’s principle. The red marked points are basic values which are distributed to every
single party by the dealer. The x-value of the basic values are public, the corresponding f(x)-values
are subject to non-disclosure and are known only by the respective party and by the dealer. If there
are enough (x,f(x))-pairs available, it is possible to solve the polynomial and calculate the secret s
accordingly.Future Internet 2011, 3 18
Figure 1. Simpliﬁed geometric representation of Shamir’s Secret Sharing.
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2.3. Secure Address Mapping in Today’s Internet
Today, the common method to determine endpoint nodes on the Internet is IPv4 which assigns a 32 bit
address to an IP-enabled device. As these addresses are difﬁcult to memorize for humans, the Domain
Name System (DNS) was established. With that, domain names can be assigned to IP addresses, which
makes them easy to remember and to type them into the web browser. When a request to one domain
name is initiated, a name resolution via DNS is triggered and the IP address of the corresponding IP
address holder, e.g., web server, is resolved. However, DNS has been exposed to various attacks like
DNS-spooﬁng, cache poisoning or denial of service attacks against name server. Some approaches
address these issues in order to provide secure routing and address respectively name resolution. One of
themostpopularoneshasbecomeDomainNameSystemSecurityExtensions(DNSSEC)[13–15]within
the last years. DNSSEC is supposed to provide origin authentication of DNS data, data integrity, and
authenticated denial of existence for DNS by means of a PKI. A DNS resolver, i.e., client, can therefore
verify the authenticity of the DNS data requested. However, DNSSEC does not provide conﬁdentiality of
theDNSdata, whichmeansthattheyaretransmittedwithoutencryption. ConﬁdentialityforDNSqueries
is provided by DNSCurve [16], which encrypts the DNS data transmitted. Furthermore, DNSSEC
leaves some security issues unanswered, e.g., it does not prevent distributed denial of service (DDOS)
attacks on name server. In fact, it is even more prone to DDOS due to the higher resource consumption
required to resolve one request. During the development process of DNSSEC, VeriSign, an operator
of two DNS root servers, proposed [17] to share the master key among all root server operators using
threshold cryptography as described in [18]. This would foster an equal voice of all operators. Currently,
VeriSign is operating a prototype to evaluate Threshold Cryptography to activate private keys by multiple
entities [19]. Anyhow, as 10 out of all 13 root server operators [20] are legally registered in the US, a
fair balance cannot be achieved on a global scale.
3. Our Next Generation Internet Architecture
In this section, a brief overview of the HiiMap architecture is given. We only discuss the aspects
which are relevant for the security extension introduced and evaluated in this article. For a more detailed
introduction, please refer to [1].
In today’s Internet architecture, the IP address has two semantic meanings. First, it serves as the
address stating who I want to communicate with and, second, where I can ﬁnd that person or node.Future Internet 2011, 3 19
Contrary to the IP addressing scheme, any protocol following the locator/identiﬁer-split principle,
provides two separate addresses—namely an identiﬁer and a locator.
One advantage of the locator/identiﬁer-split idea is the built-in support for mobility. Applications
communicate based on identiﬁers which are not changing even if a node is roaming. By changing its
connection point towards the network only the locator reﬂects the new topological location of the node.
An intelligent entity within the network is responsible to map the identiﬁer to the current valid locator.
The mapping system stores the current valid hidentifier,locatori-tuple. Whenever a node roams and its
locator changes, it needs to inform the mapping system of the updated locator. Storing multiple locators
for a single identiﬁer is also possible. In addition to the locator, a timestamp is stored with each mapping
entry. This timestamp indicates the last update of the locator.
The HiiMap architecture is based on the locator/identiﬁer-split and provides a two-tier hierarchical
mapping system. The 128 bit identiﬁer in HiiMap is a ﬂat randomized address and once assigned it
never changes other than the user requests a new identiﬁer for his node. In HiiMap, the identiﬁer can
also be used to address persons or content, but for simpliﬁcation we only consider end nodes from here
on. The mapping system in HiiMap is split into administrative domains, so called regions. Each region
holds the mapping for the nodes it is responsible for. Even if a node roams (temporarily residing within
another region) the mapping for that node is still resolved at its responsible region. To identify the
responsible region of a node, an 8 bit regional preﬁx is provided for each identiﬁer. Contrary to the
identiﬁer, this preﬁx is allowed to change whenever a node relocates to another region—this means,
switching to another provider which is associated with another region for example. Figure 2 illustrates
the identiﬁer—regional preﬁx set. The regional preﬁx for any identiﬁer can be learned in various ways. It
can be provided along with the identiﬁer from either a link on a web page or a domain name system entry.
It also can be queried at the global authority which holds the identiﬁer to responsible region mapping for
each id. To lessen the burden of the global authority, the regional preﬁx can be cached as it is expected
to change quite rarely.
Figure 2. Identiﬁer with regional preﬁx (RP).
RP 128 bit identiﬁer
Assigned for lifetime Allowed to change
(changes expected to be rare)
Figure 3 shows the topology of the HiiMap mapping system and an example of the lookup process. In
this case, node A wants to establish a connection to a server S. In case node A did not learn the identiﬁer
from a domain name system or link—and, therefore, did not learn the regional preﬁx—it ﬁrst needs to
contact the global authority (1). The global authority returns the regional preﬁx corresponding to the
server’s identiﬁer. In a next step—and all succeeding connections—user A directly contacts the region
of the server S to resolve the mapping for the locator (2). The mapping system of the region returns
the current valid locator and node A is able to send packets addressed to the locator of server S (3). In
case node A wants to communicate with another mobile node, the connection setup process remains the
same. If the second node, however, roams during the connection, it informs node A directly about its
new locator.Future Internet 2011, 3 20
Figure 3. Example HiiMap topology.
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As mentioned earlier, we partition the mapping system into multiple regions. We base the partitioning
on countries, whereby each country forms its own region. This concept has two important advantages.
Firstly, most countries show a relatively stable state. It rarely occurs that a country institutes or vanishes.
This means there is a very seldom need to adjust the regional preﬁxes. With a preﬁx length of 8 bits,
there are still enough spare preﬁx addresses for new countries. The second beneﬁt of a partitioning based
on countries is the common legal system. Each country has its own laws and ways of law enforcement.
Therefore, a region based on more than one country has to deal with different political and legal systems.
Inthiswayitiseasiertobuildtrustrelationshipsbetweenprovidersandhandleinfringementsofcontracts
by the local law enforcement. The regional mapping authorities—operated under the same law as
the participating providers—can easily be subject to contracts and business relations. Today’s DNS
registries, responsible for the Top Level Domains of countries (e.g., DENiC for .de), can be seen as a
role model for the regional authorities. The difference, however, is the direct participation of providers
in terms of ﬁnancing the authorities. We also advice that a government authority (or another non-proﬁt
organization) retains control over the regional authorities.
Further, we put a focus on reliability and scalability. To this end, we suggest to use distributed
hash tables (DHT) within the regions as a database solution for the mapping system. They are able to
scale [21] with the demands and require only low maintenance efforts due to self-organization. In case
one node within the DHT fails, the other nodes automatically take over. To keep the lookup delay to a
bare minimum, we suggest to use so called one-hop DHTs like the D1HT protocol [22].Future Internet 2011, 3 21
4. Security Approach
In this section, we describe the integration of the public key infrastructure into the HiiMap mapping
system.
4.1. PKI and the Mapping
In today’s Internet, the PKI is separated from all network services. This means that additional
resources for the PKI must be provided despite all the network elements already in place for other
functionalities (e.g., DNS server). Contrary to this, we propose to integrate the PKI into the mapping
system for the HiiMap architecture. This has the beneﬁt that resources can be shared between
functionalities and maintenance can be kept signiﬁcantly lower compared to operating separate services.
Eachmappingentryconsistsoftheidentiﬁerastheprimarykeyandasetoflocatorsbywhichthenode
currently can be reached (see Section 3). Further, a timestamp of the last update and a ﬂag, indicating
whether the location update was cryptographically signed by the node or not, is stored. Normally any
location update must be signed to prevent identiﬁer hijacking. Some devices, however, might not have
enough computational power to handle long asymmetric cryptographic operations. To integrate those
devices, the owner can request at the regional authority to send unsigned location updates. An unsigned
location update is signaled by a set ﬂag and peers can decide whether they want to start a communication
with such a node or not.
To combine the PKI with the mapping system, only the public key of each node must be additionally
stored for each mapping entry. This means that no additional protocol or infrastructure has to be provided
for querying and storing the public keys. Because the public key is a very static value and not expected to
change frequently, the additional burden for the mapping system is limited and the public key databases
canbeoptimizedforfrequentreadrequests—contrarytofrequentreadandwriterequestsforthelocators.
In comparison to today’s PKI, it is also not necessary to provide additional lists for key revocation.
This is implicitly realized by the loose identiﬁer to public key binding in the mapping system. Whenever
a public key for a certain identiﬁer changes, the old public key implicitly becomes invalid.
4.2. Trusting the Mapping
By storing the public key at only one administrative domain (region) in the mapping system, however,
the user heavily depends on the trustworthiness of that particular region. In case the mapping service
provider collaborates with an attacker, it could send a wrong or manipulated public key to the client.
Therefore, anysecurityfunctionalitybasedonthepublic/privatekeyprincipalwouldberendereduseless.
Even worse, the client considers the connection to be secure while in fact talking directly to the attacker.
To address this issue, we suggest to divide the public key into n pieces and distribute those to various
independent regions. To calculate the public key only k out of n pieces are required, using the threshold
cryptography, as explained in Section 2.2. Figure 4 illustrates an example with n = 4 and k = 3. The
client is able to reconstruct the public key from a subset of the key pieces. This means that not all key
pieces must be obtained. Untrustworthy or topology wise far away regions can be omitted and the client
can choose which regions to query for the key pieces. In that way, the key is not stored at only a single
region and at least k regions must be queried to reconstruct the key.Future Internet 2011, 3 22
Figure 4. Reconstructing the shared public key.
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In comparison to distributing full key copies to several regions, this approach has an important beneﬁt.
In case a region stores the complete key and cooperates with an attacker, it could swap the key with
another one. This is obviously a problem in case the requester relies only on a single region. Even if he
queries multiple regions, the result will be a set of non–matching keys. This means that he needs to base
his trust on the majority principle by selecting one of the keys. Some requesters might choose to cancel
the connection setup because of the irregularities of the obtained key set.
In a non-shared key system, malicious regions could generate a new public key that corresponds to
their private key and use this combination to interfere the whole system. Contrary, by only holding
a piece of the key, a malicious region can only toggle some bits in the corresponding part of the key.
This would be detected during a request as the data queried would be invalid. Once the requester has
obtained all key pieces, he only needs a subset of all pieces to reconstruct the original key. Even if he
received a modiﬁed key piece, he can use various combinations of key pieces to reconstruct the public
key. In case he accidentally included the modiﬁed piece, the reconstruction results in a non–valid public
key format. In that way, the requester knows that at least one of the pieces was modiﬁed and he needs
another variation of key pieces.
4.3. Determining the Storage Location
Having multiple pieces of the public key distributed over several regions in the mapping system, one
question remains: In which way does the client learn about the storage location of the key pieces?
Storing the list of the regions at the responsible region imposes another risk. In case the responsible
region is the attacker, it can simply manipulate this list and distribute the malicious key pieces to
collaborating regions. Therefore, the client must learn the information about the storage locations in
another way.
For the following proposal, we assume that less than 256 regions exist and for the sake of simplicity
we assume n = 4 in this example. Note that any other number up to 256 will work for n. After having
received the locator and key piece from the responsible region, the client hashes the identiﬁer to anFuture Internet 2011, 3 23
32 bit value. The hereby used hash function must satisfy the requirement that even small changes to the
input must result in a complete different hash value. This is to ensure that the key pieces of subsequent
identiﬁers are stored at different regions. We suggest to use a cryptographic hash function like SHA-1
for that matter.
In a next step, the 32 bit outcome of the hash function is split into quarters (8 bit each). Each 8 bit
value represents the storage location of one of the key pieces. We will call it key storage address space
(KSA) from now on. Since there are viewer then 256 countries, the 8 bit address space for the regions
is not completely full and a mapping directive is required. This mapping directive can be downloaded
from the global authority. It is sufﬁcient to do this very seldom, as the directive is expected to change
very rarely. For each value in the KSA, the mapping directive speciﬁes a region, where the key piece is
stored. This means that a single region can be responsible for several KSA values. In that way, the load
can be fairly distributed over all regions depending on their size. Figure 5 illustrates the process.
Figure 5. Key Piece Storage Location.
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Should the hashing and mapping to regions result in two key pieces being stored at the same
region, the ﬁrst piece is stored at this region and the second piece at the region with the next higher
region number.
4.4. Detecting Malicious Regions
With the security approach presented, clients have to query multiple key holders in order to resolve
one routing request. Depending on the setup of the Threshold Cryptography algorithm, the minimum
number of regions that have to be queried k, varies. As soon as the client has at least k resolves
conducted, it can decrypt the secret s. However, s can only be retrieved if all resolves are correct. If oneFuture Internet 2011, 3 24
of them has been modiﬁed, e.g., to disturb the whole mapping system, the secret will be corrupted. In
this case, a client can alter the regions which are taken into account for one query. In a further step, the
client could also rotate these regions to determine which region has provided an invalid response. This
can then be reported to a central entity, e.g., the global authority (GA). We propose that random probes
are also conducted by the GA periodically to monitor all regions and the operation of the overall system.
This again should be indicated to clients in order to give a hint on each region’s credibility.
4.5. Initial Key Upload
Whenever a new node connects to the network for the ﬁrst time, its public key must be stored in the
mapping system in a secure way. For security and usability reasons, we propose to use cryptographic
smart cards to store the public key, private key and identiﬁer of any node at the users side [23]. The smart
card is issued by the global authority—or one of its delegates—and initially generates a public–private
key pair on chip. One of the major advantages of smart cards is the property that the private key never
leaves the smart card. Before shipping the smart card to the user, the public key is derived from it and
stored in the mapping system. In this way, the GA is never in possession of the private key and the
public one is copied to the mapping server within a secure environment. For further details of this initial
bootstrap see [23].
4.6. Attack Scenarios
There are several attack scenarios that can be derived from the description given above. All of them
intend to either reroute a connection establishment, to disturb communication at all or to subvert the
overall trust model. The most obvious approach would be to inject a counterfeited key in one of the
regions. This, of course, would be feasible if one of the regions itself has a vicious intention to disturb the
whole system. In that case, a client would get a faked public key from that region, but as it needs multiple
regions to get the endpoint reference (see Section 4.2), the faked key would occur to the user. In fact,
keeping in mind the threshold cryptography principle depicted in Figure 1, that counterfeit key would
end up in modiﬁed (x,f(x)) -tuples which makes it impossible to determine the secret s, respectively
the correct endpoint reference.
A more sophisticated attack scenario would be a cooperation of several malicious regions which all
deploy vicious public keys. This issue can be addressed by relying on the (k,n)-threshold scheme. That
means that the number of regions k needed to determine s has to be sufﬁciently high. Apparently, this
is a trade-off between complexity, delay and security. However, we do not see the motivation of several
malicious regions cooperating in order to jeopardize the whole architecture. These attacks correspond to
DNS Poisoning in today’s Internet.
A common way to disturb communication have become Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
recently. Here, a signiﬁcant amount of clients send requests to one target. The latter one then collapses
from the sheer amount of (unreasonable) requests. Of course, this attack method is also conceivable in
the presented system. However, the vital information to keep the system up are shared between several
nodes within one region. Furthermore, multiple regions hold the same information. Therefore, the effort
to jam the system seems excessively high.Future Internet 2011, 3 25
The system relies on certiﬁcates and therefore on unique identities which ensure a trustworthy
relationship between nodes. Hence, a possible attack could also address the certiﬁcate with the private
key of one client. An attacker could then spoof his identity. To secure the certiﬁcate, the system relies on
cryptographic smart cards as described in Section 4.5. If an attacker gets possession of the smart card,
the original owner can report the loss to his corresponding regional administration which then deletes the
public key pieces from their mapping entries and replaces them with the new key pieces. The smart card,
respectively the certiﬁcate are then invalid and the user is issued a new smart card with a new certiﬁcate
on it. Consequently, the trustworthiness of identities can be ensured by the described approach.
5. Qualitative Evaluation
In order to show how our approach performs, i.e., if it can be regarded as secure and if it fulﬁlls
the performance requirements of a future internet, we present a qualitative metric of evaluation, which
matches our system against the requirements from the guidelines mentioned in [3].
We consider an AAA framework to stand out as a suitable and convenient solution, due to three
main reasons. First, Authentication, Authorization and Accounting principles infer an interaction
of mechanisms to cover the total number of security dimensions in order to provide access control,
non-reputation and privacy support. That means, countermeasures against the enumerated security
threats in Section 2.1 are considered as well. Second, an AAA framework does not establish speciﬁc
security protocols, but outlines a collection of conditions to be followed in order to progressively
customize the security level of one particular network. The integration of multiple technologies brings
some ﬂexibility and continuous scalability dynamic to the security infrastructure. Last but not least,
AAA infrastructures are subject of evaluation by multiple standards from the IETF [3], which states the
chance to review the efﬁciency of the adopted mechanisms for a future internet.
In the following we evaluate our solution against the requirements of the AAA framework. We take 4
levels of coverage as a metric to describe how our system performs: The qualiﬁcation levels are “T” for
total coverage, “P” for partial coverage, “F” for failed coverage and “OS” for out of scope of this work.
5.1. General Requirements
Table 1 lists all general requirements from the IETF AAA recommendation. The ﬁrst both issues,
scalability and fail-over, are covered by our DHT-based approach, due to the nature of the employed
DHT protocol [21]. A mutual authentication is done between the client and the mapping system based
on the used asymmetric cryptography principle. Transmission level security is generally supported
if it is required by one party, however, it has to be noted that our system resides on layers below
the transmission layer. Therefore, it is transparent to an eventual Transmission Layer Security. The
data object conﬁdentiality is only partially covered because we secure the transmission of data, but
the mapping system is open to everyone. This is because any authenticated client is able to initiate
lookup requests. As we use signatures to sign mapping responses within our architecture, integrity of
the data objects can be regarded as fully covered. The transport of certiﬁcates is not required because
the system is not relying on certiﬁcates at all. We, therefore, regard this aspect as out of scope. As all
security-related data is transmitted in a trustworthy manner—encrypted and signed—the system fulﬁllsFuture Internet 2011, 3 26
all AAA reliability requirements. IPv4 and IPv6 is completely transparent for our architecture, in fact,
our approach is not limited to IP routing respectively addressing. We therefore support both IP versions
as well as possible future network layer protocols. Correspondingly, also proxies are higher layer issues
and are therefore fully supported. The requests and replies from and to the mapping system are not
supposed to be altered on their way. This is ensured by the integrity checks. We, therefore, consider the
audability aspect to be out of scope. Our system does not require a shared secret in terms of a common
token—note the difference between shared credentials and Shamir’s shared secret. We solely rely on
asymmetriccryptography. Similarlytothesupportoffutureprotocols(networklayerandhigher), service
speciﬁc attributes can seamlessly be included into the communication pattern as this does not affect our
proposed architecture.
Table 1. AAA general requirements qualiﬁcations.
Type Requirement Rank
General Scalability T
Fail-over T
Mutual Authentication T
Transmission Level Security T*
Data Object Conﬁdentiality P
Data Object Integrity T
Certiﬁcate Transport OS
Reliable AAA Transport Mechanism T
Run over IPv4 T**
Run over IPv6 T**
Support Proxy and Routing Brokers T
Auditability OS
Shared Secret not Required T
Ability to Carry Service Speciﬁc Attributes T
*If required **Not limited to
5.2. Authentication Requirements
As can be seen in Table 2, the HiiMap architecture with its identiﬁer/locator–split principal supports
NAI right away. An authentication is not required to be authorized to resolve endpoints from the
mapping system. We therefore regard this issue as fully covered. Reauthentication is out of scope for
our concept, as connections to the mapping system only consist of a single request and response message
scheme. Higher layers, however, may implement this mechanism. All other requirements concerning
the authentication are transparently supported as they reside on higher layers.Future Internet 2011, 3 27
Table 2. AAA authentication requirements qualiﬁcations.
Type Requirement Qualiﬁcation
Authentication Network Access Identiﬁer (NAI) Support T
Authorization without Authentication T
Reauthentication on Demand OS
Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) Support T*
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Support T*
Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)/Clear-text passwords T*
*If required
5.3. Authorization Requirements
A summary of all authorization requirements is given in Table 3. Support for static and dynamic
IP address assignment is possible if required. This as well as the support for Remote Authentication
Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) is covered correspondingly to the IPv4/v6 support outlined in the
general requirements Section 5.1. The system covers the capability to reject single participants, e.g.,
if they behave in a suspicious way, due to the integration of signatures. Hence, also access rules could
be applied. As this is not meaningful in the given scenario (everybody is allowed to retrieve an address
mapping), we regard this criteria as out of scope. Layer 2 Tunneling cannot be prohibited. However,
the mapping system cannot be bypassed and, therefore, Layer 2 Tunneling has no beneﬁt to an attacker.
Reauthorization on Demand is not required here and therefore neglected. Queries from clients do not
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the system’s state, nor do they change them (as far as it is not a malicious
DDoS attack). Furthermore, the distributed self-organized mapping mechanism guarantees a steady
operable state. Unsolicited Disconnects, i.e., a disconnect initiated by the mapping system, is regarded
as failed here. Our approach handles requests on an event–basis. Therefore, there is no way for a server
to disconnect an ongoing transmission.
Table 3. AAA authorization requirements qualiﬁcations.
Type Requirement Qualiﬁcation
Authorization Static and Dynamic IP Address Assignment T*
RADIUS Gateway Capability T*
Reject Capability T
Preclude Layer 2 Tunneling OS
Reauthorization on Demand OS
Support for Access Rules and Filters OS
State Reconciliation T
Unsolicited Disconnect F
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5.4. Accounting Requirements
Accounting, in general, is not within the scope of this article as an evidence of who has requested
which address at a given time is not practical nor applicable to a global mapping system. The system puts
a focus on integrity of the requests/responses in terms of integrity and validity rather than on monitoring
each of them. However, basic requirements within the accounting section (Table 4) can be regarded as
fulﬁlled, which is a guaranteed delivery and accounting timestamps (for location updates as described
in Section 3). Dynamic accounting, which is regarded as out of scope, denotes multiple recordings of
timestamps for a single session respectively transmission. Our system does not integrate sessioning,
therefore, this has to be included in higher layer services. Other requirements as real-time accounting,
an obligatory compact encoding, the possibility to extend the accounting records as well as a batch
accounting are not incorporated here.
Table 4. AAA accounting requirements qualiﬁcations.
Type Requirement Qualiﬁcation
Accounting Real-Time Accounting OS
Mandatory Compact Encoding OS
Accounting Record Extensibility OS
Batch Accounting OS
Guaranteed Delivery T*
Accounting Timestamps T
Dynamic Accounting OS
*If required
Evaluating the overall results including general requirements, authentication, authorization, and
accounting aspects, our system fulﬁlls 92% of the requirements, partially covers 4% and misses 4%.
These results are obtained neglecting out of scope aspects.
6. Conclusions
In this article we introduced and evaluated a security approach for the HiiMap Next Generation
Internet architecture. The HiiMap architecture is a clean-slate approach which takes scalability,
reliability, mobility and political trust issues into account. A fair and trustworthy architecture for the
Next Generation Internet can therefore be achieved. Based on this foundation we presented how to
integrate a PKI into the mapping system. By using Shamir’s Threshold Cryptography principle, we
accomplished to distribute the public keys over several administrative domains (regions). In that way, a
requester is not dependent on the trustworthiness of a single region. Furthermore we showed how the
global authority can verify the integrity of each domain.
Contrary to having security functionality spread over all OSI layers, we bundled it into the network
layer. As a result a solid and consistent security functionality is provided to all upper layers. The
qualitative evaluation which has been performed according to [3] shows that we meet almost all
recommendations which are not out of scope for this security approach.Future Internet 2011, 3 29
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